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ACCIDENTAL INCEST:  DRAWING THE LINE – OR THE CURTAIN? –  
FOR REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
 
Naomi Cahn* 
  
This article  calls for  setting limits on the number of offspring born from 
any one individual’s gametes, and for continuing to sanction incest, even when it 
comes to adult, inter-sibling consensual behaviour.   The article examines the 
issues of inadvertent consanguinity raised by third-party gamete use through a 
feminist lens on both incest and reproductive technology.  The central questions 
concern regulation of reproductive technology, such as whether legal restrictions 
on the fertility market might diminish the possibilities of accidental incest, as well 
as whether criminal and civil sanctions of intrafamilial sexual behavior should 
apply to relationships created through reproductive technology; these, in turn, 
require examinations of the fertility business itself as well as broader justifications 
for incest prohibitions.   
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
   
     Incest is an increasing concern in the brave new world of test tube families.  In 1980, 
Martin Curie-Cohen raised the possibility of “inadvertent inbreeding” from donor sperm. 
Others have called this “accidental incest, where the offspring of donated sperm or ova 
meet and are unknowingly attracted.”1    The fear is pervasive, but fundamental questions 
remain:  Is this really incest?  Should the law  treat it as incest?2   In other countries, the 
                     
*  John Theodeore Fey Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, Senior 
Fellow, Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute. Thanks to Susan Bandes, Glenn Cohen, June Carbone, 
Wendy Kramer, Cynthia Lee, Nancy Levit, Joan Meier, Catherine Ross, and Bob Tuttle for donating 
support.  Thanks also to Daniella Genet and Stefani Johnson and the Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 
for believing in this project. 
 
1 Libby Purves, Whose Body is it Anyway?, Times Online, Jan. 15, 2008, available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/libby_purves/article3187337.ece; Steven Kotler, In 
an Industry Veiled in Secrecy, a Powerful L.A. sperm peddler Shapes the Nation’s Rules on Disease, 
Genetics – and Accidental Incest, LA Weekly (Sept. 27, 2007).   
2  All states criminalize sexual relationships between genetically related parents and children as well as full-
blooded siblings, and the civil system voids any marriages  between these family members.  States vary on 
the civil and criminal sanctions for relationships based on affinity, such as marriage or adoption.  See 
generally Model Penal Code § 230.2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).    
In the reproductive technology area, Guido Pennings has suggested that, in certain contexts, such as when 
one sibling uses another sibling’s gametes, that incest is a problematic concept; the traditional definition of 
incest involves a sexual relationship between family members, and the technology enables reproduction 
without any type of interpersonal sexual relationship Guido Pennings, Incest, Gamete Donation by Siblings 
and the Importance of the Genetic Link, 4 Reproductive Biomedicine Online 13, 14(2002), available at 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263980
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fears of accidental incest have resulted in precautionary legislation that place limits on 
the number of offspring any given donor can produce.  The Netherlands restricts the 
number of children from any individual donor to 25; in England and Australia, no more 
than 10 families can use the same donor, although the number of children per family is 
unlimited. In the United States, there are no legal limits on the number of offspring, but 
with more than 40,000 children born from donor eggs and sperm last year,3 concerns 
about what is now called “inadvertent consanguinity” are quite real. 
 
Outside of the reproductive technology context, incest is in the air – and on the 
air.  The ABC Sunday evening soap opera, Brothers and Sisters, has both symbolic and 
actual overtones of incest.  The highest courts in Germany and England have each upheld 
their criminal incest prohibitions within the past year.4  Legal commentators are 
suggesting that prohibitions on incest, at least when defined as private consensual sexual 
behavior between adults, may go the same way as private consensual sexual behavior 
between same-sex partners.5 
 
This article examines the issues of inadvertent consanguinity raised by third-party  
gamete use through a feminist lens on both incest and reproductive technology.  The 
central questions concern regulation of reproductive technology, such as whether legal 
restrictions on the fertility market might diminish the possibilities of accidental incest, as 
well as whether criminal and civil sanctions of intrafamilial sexual behavior should apply 
to relationships created through reproductive technology; these, in turn, require 
                                                             
http://users.ugent.be/~gpenning/  OR 
http://www.rbmonline.com/4DCGI/Article/Detail?38%091%09=%20340%09. 
This article does not address the legal or ethical issues involved in this use of the reproductive technology. 
3 See Naomi Cahn, Test Tube Families:  Why the Fertility Market Needs Regulation (forthcoming 2009).  
The Centers for Disease Control collects statistics on the number of children born from donor eggs and 
embryos, but not from donor sperm.  Estimates vary, with numbers ranging from 20,000-30,000, and 
approximately 10,000 children born from donor eggs or embryos.   Sperm banks constitute $75 million of 
the more than $3 billion annually spent in the fertility market.  Kotler, supra note __.   
 A note about language: throughout this area, language mis/represents actual practices.  Some have 
suggested, for example, that artificial insemination be labeled “alternative insemination.”  And sperm and 
egg donors are, in most cases, sperm and egg sellers, although some gamete providers are not paid for their 
contributions.  Nonetheless, the practice is controlled by the image of charitable gametic contributions, see 
Rene Almeling, . Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the 
Medical Market in Genetic Material., 72 Am. Soc. Rev. 319 (2007); “’Why do you want to be a donor?’: 
Gender and the Production of Altruism in Egg and Sperm Donation.” 25 New Genetics and Soc. 143 (2006) 
-- notwithstanding the size of the fertility market. Consider the  mixed messages on charity and 
commodification in the following news article, Stephanie Smith,  Dim Economy Moves Women to Donate 
Eggs for Profit (Aug. 6, 2008), avail. at http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/08/05/selling.eggs/index.html. 
Donor-conceived offspring who share a gamete provider may consider themselves to be “half-siblings.” 
4   Fiona Barton, Shock for the Married Couple Who Discover They Are Twins, DAILY MAIL, Jan. 12, 2008, 
1st §, at 5; Incest Remains a Crime—Mum’s Your Aunt, SYDNEY MX, Mar. 14, 2008, at 10. 
5 Lawrence v. Texas; see, e.g.,  Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and 
the Politics of Disgust:  A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 
Nw. U.L. Rev. 1543, 1609 (2005)(questioning the bases for the incest taboo). William Eskridge, Body 
Politics:  Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion,  57 Fla. L. Rev. 1011, 1057 
(2005)(“In large part because the social and normative stakes of adult incest among cousins or siblings by 
affinity are so low, Lawrence and its (or my) jurisprudence of tolerance do not clearly require that even 
these statutes violate the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
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examinations of the fertility business itself as well as broader justifications for incest 
prohibitions.  That is, if there is nothing wrong with adult siblings (or half-siblings) 
engaging in sexual relationships, then one of the primary bases for offspring-based limits 
on donors is moot.   
 
Incest lies at the intersection of family law and criminal law – the crime depends 
on the definition of family; it criminalizes what would otherwise be legal, consensual acts 
because of the family relationship between the parties.6  It is defined as involving family 
members, and it criminalizes behavior between individuals because they are family 
members, regardless of whether the underlying behavior would itself be subject to 
sanction.7  Incest also has civil implications: an incestuous marriage is void from the 
outset, without any action by either spouse.8  As courts and legislatures expand the 
definition of what should be included in the private and protected sphere of consensual 
relationships, incest should continue to be excluded.   Calls for relaxing the prohibition 
on incest come from two directions, one constitutional and the other jurisprudential. First, 
there is the claim that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas calls 
into question incest bans because of the private nature of the behavior; second, there is 
the claim that incest inherently serves to reinforce the traditional nuclear, heterosexual 
family, and is thus a patriarchal, hierarchical construct.9  Few, however, question the 
basic incest ban on relationships between genetically-related parents and children.  
Moreover, as this article argues, from both a constitutional and jurisprudential standpoint, 
incest is distinctly different from same-sex sexual behavior.    
 
                     
6  See generally Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J.  Leib, and Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, __ B.U.L. 
Rev. __ (forthcoming 2008).  Many states have criminalized incestuous relationships based both on 
consanguinity and affinity.  But see Commonwealth v. Rahim, 805 N.E.2d 13 (Mass. 2004)(incest 
indictment dismissed in case involving sexual relationship between 60 year-old stepfather and his 16 year-
old stepdaughter because of lack of blood relationship)(of the three dissenters, only one also dissented in 
Goodridge).   In the adoption context, for example, many states bar siblings who are related by adoption 
rather than blood, from marrying.  See Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 2003 Duke LJ 
1073.  As discussed infra, genetic half-siblings often do seek connection with one another. 
7   Literary critic Fran Bartkowski explains that “Kinship is the place where lines of affiliation, 
consanguinity and affinity come together.  And incest is that site where  law intervenes in these 
arrangements of intimacy.  Frances Bartkowski, Kissing Cousins:  A New Kinship Bestiary (forthcoming 
2008)(manuscript at 10). 
8  See Douglas Abrams et al., Contemporary Family Law (2006); Joan Meier, The "Right" to a 
Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 Wash. U. L.Q. 
85 (1992). 
9  See Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARD. WOMEN'S L.J. 337, 359 (2004); Note:  Inbred 
Obscurity:  Improving Incest Laws in the Shadow of the ”Sexual Family”, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2465  
(2006)(“incest law currently ignore or obscure issues of consent”);  etc..  While some advocate de-
criminalizing incest between consenting adults, there is no debate over the need to criminalize parent-child 
sexual relationships. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The Criminal 
Justice System's Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 IOWA L. REV. 131, 145-149 
(2007)(suggesting that, where it is available, prosecutors may file criminal charges under the lesser 
penalties applicable to incest than to child sexual abuse); Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Cradle of Abuse: 
Evaluating the Danger Posed by A Sexually Predatory Parent to the Victim's Siblings, 51 Emory L.J. 241 
(2002).  In discussing father-daughter incest, Wilson notes that, when one child is molested, there is a high 
risk of additional siblings being sexually abused.  Robin Fretwell Wilson, Removing Violent Parents from 
the Home: A Test Case for the Public Health Approach, 12 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y and L. 638, 665 (2005). 
 Draft 4
Ultimately, the article calls for  setting limits on the number of offspring born 
from any one individual’s gametes, and for continuing to sanction incest, even when it 
comes to adult, inter-sibling consensual behaviour.  These sanctions on adult behaviour 
need not necessarily be criminal, so long as they continue to express strong antipathy and 
disapproval.  I must confess that I feel uncomfortable in differing from many other 
thoughtful commentators in this area who have challenged the existence of a criminal 
incest ban.10  For example, Professors Collins, Leib, and Markel argue that consensual 
sexual relationships between adults, which might otherwise be subject to incest laws, 
should be decriminalized and, to the extent that there is abuse in these relationships, there 
are non-family based criminal laws that would apply.11  They would, however, “agree 
that when sexual misconduct occurs in a relationship of asymmetrical dependency, a 
sentencing enhancement is warranted for the breach of trust created by that asymmetrical 
dependency.”  12 
 
  While I agree with their concerns that incest laws can reinforce the traditional 
nuclear family form13 and infringe on private relationships, I remain concerned about the 
“breach of trust” between family members, even when the family members are adults.  
This breach of trust occurs whether family is defined by function, affinity, or genetics. 
Moreover, given that incest typically occurs between a younger woman and an older 
man, generally of a different generation (but sometimes not), I remain concerned about 
power asymmetries in these relationships based on the intersection of family and gender.  
On the other hand, applying this rationale to half-sibling who share the same donor but 
grew up in different families is far trickier; consequently, the article explores the 
traditional bases of the incest ban before suggesting that, for multiple reasons, the incest 
ban apply to such half-sibling relationships, even though these power imbalances 
probably do not exist.  The article also calls for restrictions on the number of offspring 
produced by any individual gamete donor for multiple reasons,  not just because this 
serves as a limit on the number of potential cases of “accidental incest” but also because 
of  concerns about the health of the donors, about donors’ willingness to disclose their 
identities to potentially 100 “offspring.”  
  
As an initial matter, to show the culturally contested significance of reproductive 
technology, Part I briefly explores feminist approaches to the topic.  Developing a 
feminist approach to use of the reproductive technologies requires recognizing their 
promises and limits, promises of liberation ranging from freedom from the biological 
clock to new perspectives on male bodies, and limits on women’s autonomy, ranging 
from the mothering mandate to selling eggs.  Moreover, feminism provides insight into 
the debates over whether one man can “father” too many children.  Part II turns to a 
discussion of existing practices on recruiting and limiting donors in the reprotech world.   
It then suggests reasons for enacting limits on donors, including the rationales that other 
                     
10  See, e.g., Collins, Leib, and Markel, supra note __;   Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and 
Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 709, 758-765 (2002)(questioning marital incest prohibitions). 
11 Collins, Leib, and Markel, supra note __ (draft at 67).  
12 Id. at 66.   
13  For example, incest laws would not protect a child with gay or lesbian parents, where the state does not 
allow the second parent to establish a legal relationship with the child.  Draft at 65.    
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countries have used.  For egg donors, the equation is much simpler than sperm donors; 
there are health concerns for women who donate too often.  Sperm, however, is a 
constantly renewable resource, and there is little concern about the long-term health of 
frequent donors.  Instead, the issues implicate broader concerns of incest and anonymity, 
from genetics to disease transmission to moral repugnance.  An exploration of how the 
gamete market is currently structured and managed provides the context for discussing 
the difficulties of further regulation. 
 
To many people, incest just seems wrong,14 and this fear of incest is fundamental 
to many of the justifications for incest and then to numerical limits on gamete donors. 
Part III explores the various possible sources for this fear of incest; rationales for 
justifying the incest ban come from diverse sectors, including anthropology, genetics, 
religion and evolutionary biology.  As part of the survey of perspectives on incest, it also 
discusses the conflicting approaches within feminism to incest. Next, Part IV analyzes the 
existing legal literature on incest, ranging from Justice Scalia’s hand-wringing fears about 
the limited longevity of incest bans to scholars’ arguments against the incest ban, which, 
presumably unintentionally, provide support for Scalia’s concerns.   Finally, Part V offers 
preliminary suggestions rooted in feminist theory for a justification for regulating incest. 
This article advocates limits on the numbers of children born with the use of any one 
donor’s gametes.  It may be possible to limit the number of children born with the use of 
any one donor’s gametes without a full-scale examination of incest. 
 
In the context of the new reproductive technologies, Jurgen Habermas has 
suggested that there is a need to “moralize human nature” and assert “an ethical self-
understanding of the species.”15  In responding to this challenge and examining the 
morality of our current approaches to the new reproductive technologies, my intent is to 
promote an ethical approach to developing new laws that respects human dignity.  My 
intent is also to examine the points of intersection of various feminist approaches to 
issues within reproductive technology.  Feminism appears repeatedly in considerations of 
the utility of the technologies, providing an appreciation of what it means (for the 
provider, the recipients, and the child) to use other-provided gametes.  Feminism also 
offers a framework for articulating a coherent, sensitive, and contextual approach to 
regulation.  Developing this framework includes both an examination of the differing 
feminist approaches to use of the technology (see Part I) as well as an analysis of whether 
incest provides a meaningful construct (see Part III).  
 
 
I. FEMINISM, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, AND THE MARKET 
                     
14  See Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail:  A Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment, 108 Psych. Rev. 814 (2001); David A. Pizarro and Paul Bloom:  The Intelligence of the 
Moral Intuitions:  Comment on Haidt (2001), 110 Psych. Rev. 193 (2003);  see also Paul H. Robinson, 
Robert Kurzvan, and Owen Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1633, 1645 
(2007). 
15  Jurgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature 25 (2003).  Although I disagree with his argument that 
this then should result in “ensur[ing] the contingency or naturalness of procreation,” Ibid., 25-26, I agree on 
the significance of “modernity having become reflective.” Ibid., 26.  For me, this book is reflecting on what 
modernity has wrought. 
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The promise of the reproductive technologies – producing babies – now goes 
beyond curing infertility and challenges our conception of natural families as families 
that are static and unchanging.16  Creating a family, regardless of whether you are an 
infertile husband/wife couple, a same-sex couple, or a single person, now often involves 
(although does not require!) deliberate choice.  Indeed, approximately two-thirds, or four 
million, of all pregnancies in the United States are “wanted”17 (although only a very 
small portion of these are to the millions of people defined as infertile).  Of course, use of 
the technologies is not equally available to all, regardless of sexual orientation, class, or 
race.  Moreover, the possibility of purchasing eggs, sperm, or embryos from another 
person has engendered its own controversies.   
 
The politics of reproductive technology are deeply intertwined with the politics of 
reproductive rights.18  This is a message that conservatives understand profoundly, and 
that accounts for many of the legal and policy debates swirling around the technologies, 
debates ranging from abortion to fertility treatment for poor women.   On the other hand, 
many feminists have not connected the two movements, and, although the reproductive 
rights issue has a long feminist genealogy, infertility does not.  This section first provides 
a feminist framework for understanding reproductive technology, before describing the 
infertility business and its regulation.  Feminist ambivalence to reproductive technology  
[Fragment?] 
 
A.  Feminisms and Reproductive Technologies 
 
Much of the feminist history of reproductive politics involves an examination of 
attempts to control fertility and sexuality by women, such as through contraception or the 
power to say no to sex, and by others, such as through eugenics.  While this history has 
typically  included relatively little inquiry into the need to enhance fertility, nor an 
examination of the laws surrounding conception support, there is a developing literature 
as feminists explore the multiple legal and policy issues posed by the new reproductive 
technologies.  Reproductive technologies promise to rescue women from two different 
sets of dilemmas:  1) coerced baby vessel v. voluntary motherhood; or 2) baby v. career.19   
Yet, as some feminists have alleged, these promises may be an illusion; the technology 
might simply reinforce the importance of motherhood in women’s lives and the difficulty 
of women “having it all.”    
                     
16 See, e.g., Janet Dolgin, Defining the Family: Law, Technology, and Reproduction in an Uneasy Age, 
(New York: New York University Press, 1999), 246. 
17 http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/resources/pdf/FactSheet-KeyData.pdf (2007). 
18 For insightful commentary on reproductive rights, see, e.g., Roe Rage, Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe 
Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 384 (2007); Reva 
Siegel, SEX EQUALITY ARGUMENTS FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: THEIR CRITICAL BASIS 
AND EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL EXPRESSION, 56 Emory L.J. 815 (2007).   
19   E.g., Ready, supra note __;  ; Goodwin, __ G.W.  L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009); June Carbone, ___ G.W. 
L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2009).  On the issue of childfree living, see, e.g., Elinor Burkett, The Baby Boon: 
How Family-Friendly America Cheats the Childless (2000); Maybe Baby:  28 Writers Tell the Truth About 
Skepticism, Infertility, Baby Lust, Childlessness, Ambivalence, and How they Made the Biggest Decisions 
of their Lives (Lori Leibovich ed. 2006); Nicki Defago, Child-Free and Loving It (2005). 
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1.  The Mothering Mandate 
 
In its starkest terms, the basic debate goes like this:  for those who have access to 
it, reproductive technology exploits women because it reinforces a pronatalist ideology; 
for those who do not have access to it, reproductive technology provides evidence of 
privilege, allowing wealthy white women to reproduce themselves; and the mere concept 
of reproductive technology encourages women to live men’s lives.20  With donor eggs or 
surrogacy, this involves the transfer of money from wealthier couples to poor women, 
who do not freely choose their participation.  It is a market transaction that resembles a 
sale.  Indeed, as one student note alleges, it is difficult to control the “rapaciousness of 
U.S. baby consumers.”21  The money and energy spent chasing reproductive technology  
could better be spent on reforming the child welfare system both here and abroad and 
paying for basic access to reproductive services for all women.   
 
The related critique, a “patriarchal reproduction” position, fears that women are 
unable to choose the new technologies voluntarily and that instead, male doctors or male 
partners have indoctrinated women to produce children.  Because of the mothering 
mandate, women do not really have a choice concerning whether or not to use the 
technologies; moreover, they have little understanding of the technologies themselves.22 
Women are taught to value their lives based on whether they have produced children, 
and are culturally coerced onto a never-ending treadmill of infertility.  Catharine 
MacKinnon has made similar arguments with respect to the authenticity of women's 
voices, emphasizing that women are unable to make valid choices under patriarchy.23 In 
other words, infertile women are socialized into wanting biological children and, 
therefore, the law should foreclose the possibility of choosing the new technologies so 
that women are not victimized.  Professor Michele Goodwin critiques the “seductive 
appeal” of these technologies because they appear to allow women to defer childbearing 
so that they can advance in their careers – yet the health and emotional risks of using 
reproductive technology is minimized.24  
 
While this "patriarchal reproduction" analysis presents a significant and 
cautionary perspective, it nonetheless both denies women any agency and also reinforces 
the restrictions on options by income and class. Within feminism, there are numerous 
other approaches to the possibility of reproductive technology, and other feminists might 
claim that this radical feminist approach25 denies the possibility of choice under existing 
                     
20   For an articulation of these conflicting positions, see Karey Harwood, The Infertility Treadmill:  
Feminist Ethics, Personal Choice, and the Use of Reproductive Technologies (Chapel Hill:  University of 
North Carolina Press, 2007). 
21 Nicole Bartner Graff, Note:  Intercountry Adoption and the Convention on the Rights of the Child:  
Can the Free Market in Children be Controlled?,” 27 Syr. J.. Int'l L. & Com. 405, 430 (2000).  
22 Gena Corea, The Mother Machine 166-69 (1985). 
23 Catherine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State 126-54 (1989) 
24   Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double Bind:  The Illusory Choice of 
Motherhood, 9 J. Gender Race & Just. 1, 4-5 (2005). 
25  Just as there are a diversity of views among feminists generally, each of the different strands of 
feminism has a multiplicity of views; some radical feminists have celebrated the ability to separate sex 
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social conditions, this view treats women as passive victims, disempowered from making 
their own legal choices concerning the reproductive technologies.  Religious ethicist  and 
philosopher Karey Harwood, who is concerned about the “overconsumption” of the new 
reproductive technologies and how ART encourages women to delay their childbearing, 
has nonetheless suggested that “the charge of pronatalism is overly simplistic,”26 and that 
the focus should shift to how our culture can support caregiving.  She supports the 
treatment of infertility through reproductive technology, but suggests that women 
consider having children at a younger age, rather than waiting until it becomes more 
difficult. 
 
Instead, this narrative can be turned around to become more celebratory, focusing 
on how reproductive technology allows alternative opportunities to create children, and 
may serve to disrupt the vision of the traditional married heterosexual family.  Indeed, 
many believe that the technologies are threatening because of this potential to allow 
alternative family forms that do not involve one mother and one father.27  Moreover, an 
alternative, more celebratory perspective suggests that women may have helped to shape 
the new technologies, or that women have, at least in some sense, chosen to undergo the 
risks associated with them.  It may even be, as Professor Martha Ertman argues, that 
women and men change roles when it comes to consumption of donor sperm. 28  That is, 
men are the mere sperm providers, women the discerning consumers who want men only 
for their bodies.29 Indeed, while women’s experiences are mediated through a culture that 
reinforces biological motherhood, they may still look to technology as means of 
empowerment for choosing with whom and when to have children.  
 
  2.  Having It All 
 
                                                             
from reproduction.  For one vision of this, see Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex (1970).  Debora 
Spar briefly considers the diverging early responses of feminists to IVF.  Debora Spar, The Baby Business:  
How Money, Science, and Politics Drive the Commerce of Conception 26 (2006); see also Liza Mundy, 
Everything Conceivable:  How Assisted Reproduction is Changing Our World (2007).   
26  Harwood, supra note __, at 102, 160. 
27  Elizabeth Marquardt suggests:  “Our culture needs a serious debate about the implications of 
technologies used to form many of today's alternative families . . .Our culture also needs to face up to the 
importance of mothers and fathers in children's lives.”  Elizabeth Marquardt, “My Daddy’s Name is 
Donor,” Chi. Trib. May 15, 2005, avail. at http://www.americanvalues.org/html/donor.html. As Kay 
Hymowitz charged, “American fatherhood has yet another hostile force to contend with: artificial 
insemination.”  Kay S. Hymowitz, The Incredible Shrinking Father, Chi. Sun-Times, April 29, 2077, 
available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/_chicsuntimes-the_incredible_shrinking.htm.  Some 
are opposed to creating life outside the womb.  E.g., Nicole Klass, Making Babies, For a Price, available at 
http://www.metroland.net/back_issues/vol29_no49/features.html (discussing opposition of Citizens 
Concerned for Human Life). 
28   Martha Ertman, What’s Wrong with  a Parenthood Market?  A New and Improved Theory of 
Commodification, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 1 (2003). 
29   Id. at 41. 
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  When the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM)30 decided to 
launch an infertility awareness campaign in 2001, emphasizing that a number of factors – 
ranging from smoking to age – affect infertility, it was concerned that a discussion of age 
might, on the one hand, be seen as encouraging adolescent pregnancy, and, on the other 
hand, as castigating women.  And, once the ASRM rolled out these “Protect your 
Fertility” advertisements, the National Organization for Women viewed this as a “’scare 
campaign.’”31  Advertisements, like those involving a baby bottle shaped like an 
hourglass, were viewed as giving the impression that younger women must “hurry up and 
have kids” or give up and never have them, claimed Kim Gandy, the head of the National 
Organization for Women.32  Others saw the message as telling women that they should 
not be too ambitious, and should return to their homemaking roles.33  Feminist health 
advocate Barbara Seaman   accused the major  drug companies which are engaged in 
selling hormones, of encouraging women “to feel guilty . . ., implying that infertility is on 
the rise because feminism tricked women into focusing on careers.”34  
 
As feminists have alleged, it is possible to turn women’s age-related fertility 
decline into an admonition that women should have babies at a younger age, and to 
undercut women’s advances towards equality.35  Indeed, the national average age of a 
woman’s first birth has risen from 21.4 in 1970 to 25.2 in 2004.36  For college-educated 
women, the average age of first birth is 30.1.37  “Within such a model, “responsible” 
reproduction follows financial independence and emotional maturity,”38 leading women 
to have children after they have established themselves in their careers – but at a time of 
declining fertility. Assisted reproduction thus becomes a critical component of feminist 
support for gender equity, with reminders of age-based limits as spoilers.   
                     
30   The ASRM has approximately 9,000 members, 7,000 of whom are physicians, and published a leading 
obstetrics/gynecology  scholarly journal, Fertility and Sterility.  See American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, History and Purpose,  http://www.asrm.org/history.html 
31   Liza Mundy, Everything Conceivable: How Assisted Reproduction Is Changing Men, Women, and the 
World (New York:  Knopf, 2007), 43 (quoting Kim Gandy, then president of NOW); See Claudia Kalb, 
“Should you Have Your Baby Now,” Newsweek, Aug. 13, 2001, 40. 
32   Nancy Gibbs, “Making Time For A Baby; For years, women have been told they could wait until 40 or 
later to have babies. But a new book argues that's way too late” Time Magazine, Apr. 15, 2002, Sec. 
Society, p. 48. 
33   Ibid., p. 48. 
34 Barbara Seaman, Treating Infertility:  Amid  a Confusing Array of Resources, How to Decide Which you 
can Trust, Women’s Rev. Books (2004), available at 
http://www.wellesley.edu/WomensReview/archive/2004/10/highlt.html#seaman  
35  As one woman warns, this might “merely make women feel even more anxious and guilty about being in 
a situation not necessarily of their own making.”   Jemima Lewis, Infertility, Sunday telegraph, June 8, 
2008, at 20.   For analysis of how becoming a mother affects women’s workplace equality, see, e.g., Joan 
C. Williams and Nancy Segal,  Beyond The Maternal Wall: Relief For Family Caregivers Who Are 
Discriminated Against On The Job, 25 Harv. Women’s L.J.  (2003);  the journal’s forthcoming article on a 
related issue??; Naomi Cahn and Michael Selmi, The Class Ceiling, 65_ Md. L. Rev. 435 (2006).  
36 Elizabeth Gregory, Ready: Why Women are Embracing the New, Later Motherhood 3 (2007). 
37 Id. 
38   See Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Lifting the Floor:  Sex, Class, and Education, __ Balt. L. Forum __ 
(forthcoming 2008). 
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 Shunning information about the relationship of infertility and age ignores 
biological facts and, ultimately, not only inhibits women’s understanding of their own 
fertility but also ignores the necessity of providing the legal structures necessary to give 
meaning to reproductive choice.  Information about controlling fertility must range from 
means for preventing conception to means for promoting conception.  It is only with this 
information that reproductive choice becomes a meaningful concept; choice cannot mean 
only legal control over the means NOT to have a baby, but must include legal control 
over the means to have a baby.  This knowledge can enrich the work/family literature.  
Using a younger woman’s eggs allows (for better or worse) a woman to extend her own 
fertility; using donor sperm facilitates the formation of families outside of the 
heterosexual, two-parent structure. 
 
The dichotomy between women as victims of technology and women as agents in 
needing and demanding the technology is false.  Instead, while women make choices 
constructed by and within a social ideology that values childbearing, they are still able to 
exercise some control over their options within these social constraints.  Arguing that 
women are unable to make their own decisions about reproductive technology reflects an 
outmoded view of women as dependent, passive creatures, without a corresponding 
recognition of the context in which these choices are constructed.  Instead of taking away 
options for women, the focus should be on reforming the surrounding social ideology: 
motherhood at any cost. 
 
3. Connections 
 
Feminism suggests that legal institutions should “protect and nurture the 
connections that sustain and enlarge us.”39  While this, of course, leads to respect for 
connections between family members, it also results in an acknowledgement of the 
connections that many donor siblings and parents feel to one another – and to their 
donors.  Indeed, sperm banks increasingly allow their clients to choose either identified 
or anonymous donors. 
 
 Donor-conceived offspring often rue their lack of connection with at least one-
half of their genetic heritages.40  Because they want knowledge about their biological 
progenitors, and because of their emotional needs for this knowledge, donor offspring 
and their parents have begun to advocate for disclosure of their donor’s identity.41  
Indeed, many women have begun to use the internet “to expand their kinship circle, to 
                     
39 E.g., ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 4 (1997).  Professor West continues, arguing that the law has 
not intervened in intimate relationships to protect against the dangers of connection; see generally, Linda 
McClain, The Place for Familie (2006); Naomi Cahn, Birthing Relationships, Wis. Women’s L.J. __ 
(200?).  
40  See generally Annette Appell, The New Blended Families:  Legal, Blood, and Fictive Kin Networks and 
Open Adoption 14-16 (2008)(unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
41 See Naomi Cahn, Madelyn Freundlich, and Donaldson Adoption Institute, Old Lessons for a New World:  
Applying Adoption Research and Experience to ART (2008)(forthcoming).   
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create a unique extended family.”42  Wendy Kramer and Ryan Kramer, her donor-
conceived son, started the Donor Sibling Registry (DSR) in 2000 so that they could 
establish an internet meeting place for donor-created offspring and their genetically-
related relatives.   In 2007, almost 90,000 people visited the site, and the DSR has 
facilitated contact among more than 5000 genetically-related people.43   Consider 
Gwenyth Jackaway, who found genetic half-siblings for her son, Dylan, because she 
wanted him to be “part of a larger community,” and refers to the other children she found 
as “’Dylan’s siblings.’”44  Or think about Mike Rubino, Donor 929 at California 
Cryobank.  Nine years after Donor 929 began providing sperm, Oprah Winfrey aired an 
episode about donor-conceived families.  Rubino logged on to the Donor Sibling Registry 
web site, and ultimately discovered that Rachael McGhee had written a thank you 
message to Donor 929.  He contacted her, the two of them talked, and she, along with her 
two children that resulted from his sperm, spent a week with him in California.45    
Ironically, some parents who have found offspring from the same donor through the 
Donor Sibling Registry have left the site because they have been overwhelmed by too 
many possible connections.46 
 
 Biological connection is, of course, only one way to form a family, yet the genetic 
ties between their children cause many women to feel to feel family-like connections 
with each other. 
 
  * * * * 
 
As is clear, there is no one feminist approach to fertility nor, as discussed later in the 
article, to incest.  The basics, examining the impact of gender, race, sexual orientation, 
and class of any particular approach or policy, are a given.  Beyond that, however, how 
to measure those impacts, how to assess those impacts, how to accommodate those 
impacts, there is no agreement.   Feminists are ambivalent over whether reproductive 
technology is a blessing because it facilitates reproduction and the formation of 
alternative families, or whether it is a curse because it facilitates “too much” biological 
mothering47 and class and race distinctions concerning access.  Similarly, as discussed in 
the next section, the reproductive technology world itself has developed with little 
consensus or regulation of these issues; fertility clinics may discriminate based on sexual 
orientation, for example, there are no binding standards on how many embryos to 
                     
42   Liza Mundy, Everything Conceivable:  How Assisted Reproduction is Changing Men, Women, and 
the World 169 (2007)  
43http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/; see Mundy, supra note -_, at 168; Claudia Kalb, A Sperm-Biz 
Overhaul, Newsweek, June 2, 2008, p. 41 
44 Emily Bazelon, The Children of Donor X, O Mag., p. 250, April 1, 2008. 
45 Michael Leahy, Family Vacation, Wash. Post.  June 19, 2005; Page W12. 
46  See Cheryl Miller, Parenthood at Any Price, The New Atlantis (2007), avail. at 
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/parenthood-at-any-price.  She also points out that it is difficult 
for a sperm donor to “connect” with multiple offspring. 
47 That is, it puts pressure on women to  become mothers; and it discourages mothering non-biological 
children by disfavoring adoption. 
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transfer, there is no requirement that anyone keep track of the numbers of children born 
from sperm donors.48    
 
 
B.  Unlimited Giving;  The Donor World 
 
For anyone seeking sperm, there are thousands of possibilities.  In the U.S. alone, 
there are dozens of sperm banks in a business that accounts for about $75 million per 
year.49 Consumers can let their fingers do the walking online, all in the privacy of their 
own home.  Banks provide differing levels of screening, offer videos, ship frozen sperm 
in special canisters, or specialize in particular donor characteristics.  There is even a site 
that will help with the shopping so that the consumer doesn’t have to search each website.  
Although frozen egg banks are relatively new, there are countless means for finding egg 
providers, ranging from special matching services that are part of larger fertility clinics to 
stand-alone recruiting options.  And the number of physicians offering assisted 
reproductive services has increased exponentially.  The main trade group, the Society for 
Assisted Reproductive Technology, reports that it has 392 members practices within the 
United States that offer reproductive technology services, accounting for more than 95% 
of all fertility clinics.50  
 
Yet there are few systems in place to monitor gamete providers.  In one of the 
only studies to look at quality of sperm from commercial providers, Douglas Carrell and 
his co-authors found more than a quarter of the participating sperm banks could be 
providing “suboptimal” sperm.51  Researchers at New York University found that egg 
donors frequently understated their weight.  They looked at charts for more than 300 
patients, and then compared the weight that donors reported when they first came to the 
clinic with the actual weights at their first physical exams, and concluded that “donors do 
not give accurate measurements of their body weight.”52  Yet there are no requirements 
that clinics verify the information submitted by donors; the only federal requirements 
concern the safety testing of the gametic material. 
 
Although reproductive technology is today a multibillion dollar business, the 
amount of state and federal regulation over any of the participants is limited, as is the 
amount of self-regulation.  The lack of market oversight has repeatedly been traced to the 
comparatively limited use of the technology until the 1980s, as well as the contested 
nature of the technology’s relationship to parenthood and other social issues.  The 
                     
48  Because fertility clinics must report success rates, however, they do report the use of donor eggs and 
embryos. 
49   Steven Kotler, The God of Sperm: In an industry veiled in secrecy, a powerful L.A. sperm peddler 
shapes the nation's rules on disease, genetics - and accidental incest, LA Weekly, Sept. 26, 2007, 
http://www.laweekly.com/news/news/the-god-of-sperm/17290/.   
50 Eric Surrey, “What is SART?,” Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, available at 
http://www.sart.org/WhatIsSART.html 
51 Douglas T. Carrell, et al., “Prospective, Randomized, Blinded Evaluation of Donor Semen Quality 
Provided by Seven Commercial Sperm Banks,” 78 Fert. & Sterility 16, 20 (July 2002). 
52 M. Cho and F. Licciardi, “Egg Donors Significantly Under-Report their Weights,” 86 Fert. & Sterility 
(Supp. 1)  S138 (Sept. 2006). 
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technologies and their uses have radically changed over the past several decades, with, 
for example, commercial sperm banks supplanting doctor-chosen sperm and the 
increasingly successful use of donor eggs.  Many of the controversies in this area have 
appeared, and have been temporarily resolved, outside of the law: in doctors’  offices, in 
scientific advances, or in philosophical inquiries.  It may well, as one legal scholar 
suggested, have been appropriate “to allow non-legal institutions such as ‘science’ or 
‘medicine’ to be the primary forum for policy debate and resolution,”53 particularly in 
light of the secrecy surrounding individuals’ use of the technology and the legal 
consequences of coming forward.   
 
Until the mid-1980s, the market for sperm was quite small.  As infertility 
physician Barry Verkauf explained in 1966, the medical literature contemplated only 
three uses for donor sperm: when the “husband” was infertile, when children had died 
from Rh incompatibility, and when the husband had a heredity disease that should not be 
passed on the children.54   In the rare cases where donor sperm was used, it was typically 
provided by friends or family of the recipient, did not involve payment to the donor, and 
did not involve frequent donors.  Issues involving limits on the number of children 
resulting from any individual donor were essentially moot; given the ever-changing 
composition of medical school classes, there was an enormous pool and relatively few 
solicitations.   
 
1.  Donating to History 
 
The first recorded artificial insemination of a woman occurred in 1785 when Dr. 
John Hunter impregnated the wife of a London linen merchant with her husband’s 
sperm.55  Another hundred years passed before Dr. William Pancoast performed the first 
artificial insemination using donor sperm, the sperm of someone besides the patient’s 
own husband, in 1884.56   The woman never knew that she had been inseminated by a 
stranger’s sperm.  Even if the husband had consented, artificial insemination by a donor 
was somewhat scandalous, because it might expose the woman to a charge of adultery.   
   
 In 1948, the influential physician and lawyer Alfred Koerner, who was the 
Executive Secretary to the National Research Foundation for Fertility, Inc., wrote one of 
the first articles in a law journal addressing donor insemination.  He observed that it was 
important for the recipient woman to trust  her physician to choose the right donor as well 
as not to disclose her use of donor sperm.57   
 
                     
53 Larry Palmer,  Book Reviews, 38 Jurimetrics J. 223, 234-35 (Winter 1998); see generally Gaia Bernstein, 
The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies:  A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 Wash. L. 
Rev. 1035, 1039-1041 (2002). 
54   Barry Stephen Verkauf, Artificial Insemination:  Progress, Polemics, and Confusion – An Appraisal of 
Current Medico-Legal Status,  3 Hous. L. Rev. 277, 282 (1966). 
55 Wilfred J. Finegold, Artificial Insemination 6 (1964); “History 1500- 1900,” Center for Reproductive 
Medicine available at http://www.repromed.org.uk/history/history_1500.htm  
56Andrew Chang, “Anonymous Sperm Donation in an Era of Technology, Bioethics, and Business,” 3 
Yale. J. Pub. Health 3 (2006), available at http://www.yaleph.com/archive/vol3no3/article3.html  
57 Alfred Koerner, Medicolegal Considerations in Artificial Insemination,  8 La. L. Rev. 484, 490 (1948).   
 Draft 14
By the late 1980s, more than 400 sperm banks were in operation.58  Yet banks still 
sold their wares primarily to doctors; in 1987, 60 percent of sperm banks in a federal 
survey would sell only to doctors, and none would sell only to recipients.59  Sperm 
banking became increasingly patient-oriented  throughout the 1980s.   In a series of 
articles for Slate magazine, journalist David Plotz credits the Repository for Germinal 
Choice (also known as the “Nobel Sperm Bank”), created in the late 1970s’,  with 
transforming the sperm banking business by requiring rigorous testing and providing 
increasing amounts of information to consumers.60  Other banks began offering the same 
services, and the AIDS epidemic added more incentives for additional safety tests.61    
 
While there are no reliable figures on who uses sperm banks, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that their usage by heterosexual couples is declining, but that usage by single 
women and lesbians is increasing.    .  
 
2.  The Incredible Egg 
 
 Egg provision has a far shorter history.  The first documented  egg donation 
occurred in 1983; by 2003, clinics used more than 14,000 eggs in fertility procedures.62  
Egg donation began with identified donors, who were often related to the recipients.  
Today, identified donors constitute a much smaller part of the donation pool and 
recipients are more likely to use specifically recruited donors. Eggs are typically 
available under two circumstances:  first, women already undergoing an IVF cycle may 
agree to provide their eggs to other women in exchange for a reduced IVF fee; and 
second, women from outside of the clinic may be recruited specifically to provide eggs.63 
  
 Until recently, most donor eggs had to be “fresh.”   Worldwide, there were only 
about two hundred children who had been born through the use of frozen eggs in 2006, 
and egg banks were just beginning to be established.64     Frozen eggs, however, provide 
various opportunities for expanding the market in eggs, perhaps resulting in increasing 
numbers of banks – and increasing the opportunities for a woman to donate multiple 
times.     
 
3. Clinically Speaking 
 
                     
58 Karen M. Ginsberg, Note: FDA approved?: A Critique of the Artificial Insemination Industry in the 
United States, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 823, 826 (1997)(although the number of sperm banks used is not 
specified, “[b]y 1993, more than 80,000 women were undergoing AI each year, resulting in the conception 
of more than 30,000 babies”). 
59   “Artificial Insemination Practice in the United States,” OTA, p. 11. 
60   See David Plotz, Collected “Seed” (2005), http://www.slate.com/id/2119808/.   
61   E.g., Mundy, Everything Conceivable, supra note __,   at 112. 
62 Golden Eggs; Drowning in credit- card debt and Student Loans, Young Women are Selling their 
Eggs for Big Payoffs. But Can They Really Make the Right Medical and Moral Decisions When 
They’re Tempted With $15,000, The Boston Globe, June 25, 2006, Sec. Magazine,  p. 18. 
63 ASRM Ethics Committee Report, “Financial Compensation of Oocyte Donors,” p. 305. 
64 James W. Akin et al., Initial Experience with a Donor Egg Bank, 88Fert. & Sterility 497, 500 (2007). 
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According to UCLA sociologist Rene Almeling, both egg and sperm donation 
programs are structured similarly, with comparable stages for donors and recipients.65  
All programs must first recruit donors, and then screen them.  The screening typically 
includes collection of both medical and personal history data.66  Aside from the laws 
governing the various contractual relationships, few of which apply directly to 
reproductive technology, this is perhaps the only other stage where the law plays a direct 
role in the reproductive industry, mandating certain safety tests (discussed in the next 
section) of the donated gametic material.   
 
Third, the agency helps the donor prepare a personal profile, and then advertises 
the profile.  Clinics vary considerably as to how much information is included in this 
profile.  While egg donors may be identified through a picture and a first name, sperm 
donors are more typically identified by number until the recipient requests (or pays for) 
additional information.67  This difference in the initial introduction to gametes may be 
gendered68, or it may be due to the comparative number of sperm and egg donors or the 
lengthier process for producing eggs than sperm. 
 
Once the profile is publicly available, the next stage involves matching donors 
and recipients – and collecting fees.  Programs are now required by federal law to do 
some minimal follow up with sperm donors, such as by making sure that they are tested 
for HIV once they have stopped providing samples altogether.69               
 
4. Inspecting Gametes 
 
 Over the past several decades, the federal government has taken a few tentative 
steps towards the regulation of reproductive technology.  Today, it oversees clinical 
laboratory services, drugs and medical devices that are used in IVF treatments, has 
established standards for the use of human tissue, and provides monitoring of fertility 
clinic success rates.70   Federal regulations covering the safety of “human cell, tissue, or 
cellular or tissue-based products,” which included donor gametes, were finalized in 
2005.71  All gamete providers must be screened, and all of their “products” must be tested 
by federal law.72    
 
                     
65   Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender:  Egg Agencies, Sperm banks, and the Medical Market 
in Genetic Material, 72 Am. Soc. Rev. 319 (2007). 
66 ASRM, “Psychological Assessment of Gamete Donors and Recipients,” 77 Fert. & Ster. Supp. 5, 11 
(2002).. 
67   This description draws on my own analysis of egg and sperm banks as well as that of Almeling, 
“Selling Genes, Selling Gender,” p. 319   
68 This set-up does appear much more revelatory and intimate for women, while more protective of the 
privacy of men; on the other hand, there are other reasons for this market development. 
69   Almeling, “Selling Genes, Selling Gender,” p. 334. 
 
71   cite to human tissue regs. 
72 Betsy Streisand, “Who’s Your Daddy? Sperm Donors Rely on Anonymity. New Donor Offspring (and 
Their Moms) are Breaking Down the Walls of Privacy,” U.S. News & World Report, February 13, 2006, 
Sec. Health & Medicine, p. 53. 
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In addition to implementing standards for testing donors, the federal regulations 
require that donation facilities maintain sufficient staff to ensure that they can comply 
with the federal regulations, and personnel must be competent based on measures of  
education, experience, and training.73  Clinics must establish their own internal quality 
control program to make sure that any corrective actions are documented, personnel 
receive proper training and education, periodic audits are performed, and computer 
software is validated for its appropriate use.74  Clinics must also set up procedures for all 
steps involved in the screening, testing, and determination of eligibility.75   
 
 Other than through these procedures for safety, federal law does not regulate the 
medical procedures involved in donation.  Clinics are not required to meet additional 
standards (other than, perhaps, with respect to “tissue”), by preventing discrimination 
against certain potential recipients or donors, by mandating any ongoing obligation for 
donors to report health information, by regulating the disclosure of information to any 
subsequently-born children, or by limiting the numbers of embryos transferred per cycle, 
or even the number of times that one person can provide sperm or eggs to another. As one 
journalist accurately charged after a thorough report in 2007 on California Cryobank, the 
largest sperm bank in the world, “the industry has operated almost completely 
unmolested. Outside of a mostly inept series of somewhat bizarre FDA rulings, there is 
no top-down governance in the field. It is, as it has always been, self-policing.”76  For its 
part, the industry often resists further regulation, claiming that it restricts patient choice 
by creating market constraints.  On the other hand, as discussed in the next section, there 
are industry, non-binding guidelines on these issues. 
   
5.  The State of Industry Regulation 
 
Long before the federal standards became effective, the reproductive technology 
industry had undertaken self-regulation.  This process is still ongoing, and the industry 
has established its own voluntary standards and processes of accreditation that co-exist 
with the federal and state regulations.  The industry has also developed a series of ethical 
guidelines that, again, are not binding, but that contain advice and standards on a variety 
of topics that go beyond basic ART medical practice.   
 
The ASRM Practice Committee has developed recommendations on the number 
of babies born with one donor’s gametes.   These recommendations are explicitly based 
on concerns about genetically related donor offspring having children together (rather 
than, for example, risks of widespread transmission of genetic disease or health issues for 
donors):77   
.   
                     
73 21 C.F.R. § 1271.170. 
74 21 C.F.R. § 1271.160. 
75 21 C.F.R. § 1271.47. 
76 Kotler, supra note __. 
77   See Practice Committee of the American Soc. for Reprod. Med., Repetitive Oocyte Donation, 86 (Supp. 
4) Fert. & Ster. S216 (2006). 
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Institutions, clinics and sperm banks should maintain sufficient 
records to allow a limit to be set for the number of pregnancies for which a 
given donor is responsible.  It is difficult to provide a precise number of 
times that a given donor can be used because one must take into 
consideration the population base from which the donor is selected and the 
geographic area that may be served by a given donor.  It has been 
suggested that in a population of 800,000, limiting a single donor to no 
more than 25 births would avoid any significant increase of inadvertent 
consanguineous conception.78 
 
These standards are highly influential, but there is no regulatory agency that 
oversees individual donors nor that monitors gamete banks on a routine basis.   Banks 
and clinics are not required to verify the personal information or much of the medical 
information that donors provide them, nor is there a mechanism for monitoring limits on 
the number of times  that one individual can provide gametic material to another.  Nor 
must banks monitor what happens to the gametic material once it leaves their offices, and 
there is no tracking of donors’ nor their offspring’s genetic diseases or other problems. 
The occasional “mix-ups” that make their way into court remind consumers and the 
public of the lack of oversight79, but the existing legal framework for remedying and 
preventing these “mix-ups” is entirely inadequate.  Moreover, given the mobility of many 
Americans (and overseas gamete purchasers), limits based on an area population of 
800,000 may not be adequate. Donors, those who use their gametic material, and donor-
conceived offspring are beginning to understand the limits of current oversight and to 
advocate for change.80  Laws must mandate better practices, rather than relying on 
industry internal guidelines and voluntary compliance.  
 
C. Are We Alone Out There?  Practices in Other Countries 
 
Many other countries have imposed limits on the numbers of offspring produced 
by any individual donor.  In its landmark report in 1984, England’s Warnock 
Commission recommended that no more than 10 children be born from any individual 
donor.81  The Commission explained its concern about “the remote possibility of 
unwitting incest between children of the same donor, and because of risks of transmission 
of inherited disease,” but noted that “there was no conclusive argument for any particular 
                     
78   Practice Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine and the Practice Committee of 
the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, 2006 Guidelines for Gamete and Embryo Donation, 86 
(Supp. 4) Fert. & Ster. S38, S43 (2006).  Although this recommendation is focused on sperm donors, the 
ASRM has made the same recommendation for egg donors.  See Repetitive Oocyte Donation, supra note 
__, at S217. 
79 There have been several reported cases of embryos that were wrongly implanted in the wrong woman, 
for example.  See Cahn, Test Tube Families. 
80   The DonorSibling Registry, which, as discussed earlier, connects donor-conceived individuals, has 
various discussion groups where participants discuss the number of children who should be born from each 
donor and argue for changing the current system.  See 
http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/DSRblog/?cat=4 
81 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology 26-27 (1984). 
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figure.”82  Subsequently, the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority did 
not limit the number of children born with any particular donor’s gametes, but limited the 
number of families who could use one donor’s gametes to ten (each family could have 
more than 10 children, of course).83  Austria allows donors to provide gametes to only 
one clinic, with a limit of three couples.84  Other countries have focused on the number of 
children. For example, in Hong Kong, legislation was enacted in 2007 to limit the 
number of children born from any single donor to three.85  Spain limits the number of 
children born with any one donor’s gametes to 6.86 
 
A second means of preventing “accidental incest” involves ensuring that offspring 
know they are donor-conceived.  In the United Kingdom, legislation has been introduced 
requiring special notations on birth certificates for the donor conceived.  And the state of 
Victoria, in Australia, has launched a “Time to Tell” campaign, encouraging parents to 
tell their children of their origins in an effort to ensure honesty as well as to prevent 
potentially consanguineous unions.87 
 
III.  Why Ban Incest? 
 
The traditional justifications for incest bans have centered on religion, genetics, 
and anthropology; newer accounts have brought in insights from evolutionary biology to 
support “kinship avoidance” behaviour.  Freud, of course, opined that incest was natural, 
that girls inevitably felt sexual desire for their fathers.88  Although the veracity of this 
analysis has been repeatedly questioned, it is essentially irrelevant to any explanation or 
reasons for the ban (although it does provide support for ensuring that it a ban exists).  
My goal in this section is to provide a brief review of other explanations and 
justifications for the prohibition.     
 
1. Traditional and Modern Justifications   
 
Traditional and more contemporary justifications for the incest ban include: 
genetics, anthropology, evolutionary biology, and morality. The genetic justification 
points to the increased probability of inherited diseases resulting from consanguineous 
relationships.89  When it comes to gamete donation, there is also the possibility of 
                     
82  Id. at 26.  The Commission recommended ongoing review of whether 10 was the appropriate number.  
Id. at 27. 
83 See HFEA, Infertility:  The HFEA Guide 31 (2007), avail. at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Guide2.pdf   
84   Howard Jones, et al., IFFS Surveillance 07, 87 Fert. & Ster. S28, S28 (2007). 
85 Ella Lee, Database to Track Sperm and Offspring: records kept to Avoid Incest, Unethical Acts, South 
China Morning Post, Feb. 13, 2008, p. 3.  
86   Jones, et al., supra note __, at 28, 31. 
87 Evonne Barry, Who’s Your Daddy?  Donor Kids “Must be Told,” Sunday 
Herlad Sun, Aug. 10, 2008, at p. 24. 
88   See Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (James Strachey trans., Basic Books 
1975) (1905); Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 Col. L. Rev. 209, 221-222 (2001); 
Rebecca J. Whitcombe, Child Sexual Abuse:  Adult Survivors, Repressed Memories, and Stories Finally 
Told, 11 UCLA Women’s LJ 255, 267 (2001). 
89 Robin Bennet et al., Genetic Counseling and Screening of Consanguineous Couples and Their Offspring: 
Recommendations of the National Society of Genetic Counselors, J. Genetic Counseling 11, 97-119 (2002) 
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dispersing one person’s diseases widely.  The American laws on incest are derived from 
British ecclesiastical laws on prohibited marriages, and by the beginning of the twentieth 
century, as states developed their marriage laws, all states banned some types of 
incestuous marriages.90   As mentioned earlier, incestuous relationship may subject both 
parties to prosecution under criminal law and also result in marriages that are void.  That 
is, incest is a “double wrong” against the public, with both a criminal and a civil 
component; unlike many other criminal acts, the civil wrong does not result in a private 
remedy but in public non-recognition of the relationship.91   
 
Genetics:  In any given non-consanguineous relationship, the rate of severe 
abnormalities in offspring is 2-3.5 percent.92    Between first cousins, the risk increases to 
between 3-7 percent , while children of siblings or a parent-child coupling have a risk 
between 32-44 percent93. While it is difficult to study the impact on humans over 
numerous generations, studies of other animals show the genetic costs of inbreeding.  
When sibling birds are paired over successive generations, the offspring line dies out 
because “some damaging genes are more likely to be expressed in inbred animals.  Some 
potentially harmful genes are recessive and therefore harmless when they are paired with 
a dissimilar gene, but they become damaging in their effects when combined with an 
identical gene.”94  
 
The higher rate of genetic abnormalities in consanguineous relationships provides 
a partial justification for the incest prohibition.  Yet it does not entirely explain the 
strength of the prohibition, given that we do not require genetic testing “even when there 
is a strong likelihood that each parent carries a recessive trait, as in the case of Tay-Sachs 
disease in the Ashkenazi Jewish community.”95  Moreover, the incest ban arose prior to 
our contemporary understanding of the relationship between genes and consanguinity.  
On the other hand, early incest bans may have resulted from the anecdotal observations 
of abnormal children who resulted from sexual relationships between closely-related 
family members.96  The genetic justification does not, however, explain the ban on sexual 
                     
90   Grossberg, Governing the Hearth, at 111, 145.   
91 Indeed, the remedy of a void marriage from the outset appears contrary to the wishes of the individuals 
involved (who consented to the marriage in the first place, and so would appear unlikely to want to 
invalidate their own marriage). 
92  See Robin L. Bennett, Louanne Hudgins, Corrinne O. Smith, and Arno Motulsky, Inconsistencies in 
Genetic Counseling and Screening for Consanguineous Couples and Their Offspring:  The need for 
Practice Guidelines, 1 Genetics in Medicine 286, 286-87 (1999). 
93 See Helen V. Virth, Jane A. Hurst, and Judith G. Hall, 
Oxford Desk Reference: Clinical Genetics 370 (2005).  They point out that the estimated risk is actually lower than 
the observed, empirical risks;  the stimated risk is 12.5% for recessive disorders,w hile the observed risk is 30%.  
Apart from physical abnormalities, the empiric risk for mental disability is closer to 50% in sibling/sibling and 
parent/child unions. Id.  The estimated rate for half-siblings is approximately one-half that of full-blooded siblings.  
Id.  Other studies vary dramatically on the actual genetic risks.   
94 Patrick Bateson, Inbreeding Avoidance and Incest Taboos, in Inbreeding, supra note __, at 24, 25. 
95 Cahill, supra note __, at 1570. 
96   Certainly, by 1872, one of the leading family law treatises, noted:  “’Marriages between persons closely 
allied in blood are apt to produce an offspring feeble in body, and tending to insanity in mind.’”  Michael 
Grossberg, Governing the Hearth:  Law and the Family in Nineteenth Century America 145 (1985) 
(quoting Joel Bishop, Commentaries on Marriage and Divorce, 5th ed. 273 (1874). 
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relationships between affinity-related family members, such as adoptees or step-
relatives.97 
 
Given our knowledge about genetics, we might decide it is appropriate, based on 
potential harm, to police certain relationships because of the statistically significant 
increased risk of genetic abnormalities.  The risk of harm to future offspring is palpable 
and certain (although most such offspring will not experience these abnormalities)98.  
Modern understandings of genetics provide a strong basis for making such an assessment, 
regardless of whether this justification provided an historical explanation for the incest 
ban.  It may even be possible that, through the process of evolution (discussed below), 
natural selection favored behaviours of kin avoidance; offspring of consanguineous 
matings were less likely to survive.  Ultimately, the genetics explanation separates into 
two arguments: higher risk of birth defects, and an inherited tendency toward taboo.   
 
To alleviate the concern over birth defects, in light of advances in genetic 
understandings, it would be possible to allow incestuous relationships between relatives 
who are incapable of procreating, or to require genetic testing in the case of pregnancy.   
Although this might raise privacy concerns, it might be a constitutionally sustainable 
compromise.  Nonetheless, it would not address the other potential justifications for 
maintaining an incest ban   
 
Anthropology:  A discussion of taboo brings us to the classic anthropological 
formulation, which  belongs to Claude Lévi-Strauss.  He explained that the incest 
prohibition forced families to marry outside of their closed, biological units by creating 
bonds with other groups, thereby overcoming “the isolating influence of 
consanguinity.”99  These bonds assured more harmonious group relations by assuring 
kinship with potential enemies. A second, and equally familiar, explanation from the 
anthropology literature, which addresses parent-child incest, focuses on the harmony of 
intrafamilial relationships.100  Later anthropologists have suggested that the incest taboo 
was not just a cultural artifact, but also biologically-based.101  The issue of whether the 
taboo, as a natural phenomenon should give basis to criminal liability may be a tough 
question.  . 
 
Evolutionary biology:  Evolutionary biology may provide understanding of the origins 
and maintenance of the incest ban, although it does not provide a justification per se.102  
                     
97  See Bratt, supra note __, at 352-53; Cahn, Perfect Substitutes, supra note __. 
98   The increasing use of screening tests before and during pregnancy 
can help in reducing this risk. 
99 Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Family, 278, in Man, Culture, and Society (Henry Shapiro  ed. 1956); see 
Claude Lévi-Strauss,  THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 479 (Rodney Needham ed., 
James Harle Bell & John Richard von Sturmer trans.1949( 1969); Susan McKinnon, The Economies in 
Kinship and the Paternity of Culture: Origin Stories in Kinship Theory, in Relative Values:  Reconfiguring 
Kinship Studies 277, 288-298 (Sarah Franklin and Susan McKinnon  eds. 2001).  
 
100   See Jack Goody, A Comparative Approach to Incest and Adultery, 7 Brit. J. Soc. 286, 301 (1956). 
101  
102 As June Carbone and I have argued, just because a particular behaviour has evolved in a certain way, 
this does not mean that we as a legal society must legislate to reinforce that behaviour. 
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Evolutionary biologists have found a kinship avoidance behaviour, but believe that it is 
associated with familiarity rather than genetics. 
 
In his 1894 book, Edward Westermarck suggested that sexual aversion develops 
between family members who are raised together.103  Subsequent experiments have 
confirmed and refined his initial hypothesis, suggesting a strong psychological 
mechanism against sexual relationships with intimate family  members that does not 
necessarily depend on shared genes but on behaviours most likely to detect shared genes.  
While it is difficult to perform a controlled experiment on the Westermarck hypothesis, 
evidence from Israeli kibbutzim and Taiwanese marriages provide support for an 
evolutionarily-based incest avoidance behaviour.  In his study of 14,000 Taiwanese 
women and their fertility, Arthur Wolf found that early cohabitation (beginning during 
infancy or at a young age) with a later “mate” resulted in lower fertility  and a higher 
divorce rate than did marriages between mates who were not raised together.104  Although 
the individuals were not genetically linked so this lack of sexual interest might be the 
result of cultural messages, this appears unlikely; it would require both that culturally-
imposed inhibitions against incest “are somehow transmitted from elders to  offspring 
with exceedingly high reliability; and second, such messages [must] affect the 
development of sexual attraction with exceedingly high reliability.”105   In a test 
involving 600 subjects, researchers found that childhood observations of a mother’s 
interactions with another child and coresidence with a sibling provide a strong basis for a 
“kinship estimator.”106   The subjects were asked about family composition and 
coresidence, and then answered questions about their altruistic behaviour towards their 
siblings (for example, how they had helped siblings in the past and whether they would 
donate a kidney for a sibling) or their attitudes towards a series of sexual acts, including 
some with family members.  Older children observing their mothers’ interaction with a 
younger sibling was the strongest cue for predicting kinship estimation.  While Freud 
believed that the incestuous impulse was natural and that cultural factors prevented its 
full expression, contemporary evolutionary biologists and psychologist believe just the 
opposite:  incest avoidance is unnatural, and incest occurs because of a disruption in 
normal relationships.107  
 
                     
103 Edward Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage (1894). For one application of the hypothesis in 
the legal literature, see David J. Herring, Foster Care Placement:  Reducing the Risk of Sibling Incest, 37 . 
Mich. J.L. Ref. 1145, 1147-1162 (2004)(discussing Westermarck’s thesis and two studies of Irene Bevc 
and Irwin Silverman showing that opposite sex siblings who live together before the age of 3 develop a 
strong aversion to incest). 
104   Arthur Wolf, Sexual Attraction and Child Association:  A Chinese Brief for Edward Westermarck 
(1995). 
105 Debra Lieberman and Donald Symons, Commentary, Sibling Incest Avoidance:  From Westermarck to 
Wolf, 73 Q. Rev. Bio. 463, 465 (1998). 
106 Debra Lieberman, John Tooby, & Leda Cosmides, The Architecture of Human Kin Detection, 445 
Nature 727,730 (2007); see also Debra Lieberman, John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, Does Morality have a 
Biological Basis?  An Empirical Test of the Factors Governing Moral Sentiments Relating to Incest, 270 
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. 819 (2003). 
107   See, e.g., Mark Erickson, Rethinking Oedipus:  An Evolutionary Perspective of Incest Avoidance, 150 
Am. J. Psych. 411 (1993); Lieberman and Symonds, supra note __. 
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Evolutionary behaviours can also help explain the parent-child taboo.  Because 
such behaviour distorts a child’s long-term mating strategies, researchers have suggested 
that the incest taboo provides a generally effective prevention mechanism108 against  
 
psychopathologies, which, in turn, reduce the affected individuals' chances 
for normative marriage and parenting profiles. In addition, a similar 
dynamic would hypothetically result from adult-male to boy incest. It is 
suggested that to minimize the chances of adult-child sexual intercourse, 
incest taboos have historically been reinforced and extended to 
nonparental adults, especially men, beyond the immediate nuclear 
family.109  
 
Indeed, some have suggested that the process of human evolution has actually  
“selected for genes that cause organisms to develop behavioral systems that lead 
them away from mating with close genetic relatives,” particularly given the strong 
association of incest with visceral reactions of disgust.110  
 
Morality:   Moral repugnance and disgust have served as traditional bases for the 
incest ban (and, indeed, a full discussion of the significance of emotion to legal reasoning 
is well beyond the scope of this article, although it is an issue that must be recognized111).  
“Many states legislate against a lot of activities [such as] . . . incest . .  just because those 
activities are wrong.”112  Disgust is a cluster of approaches based in human emotional 
reactions to various acts, involving extreme aversion typically based on a fear of 
contamination.113   It is inherently connected with underlying cultural values, although 
some behaviours appear to elicit disgust across cultures.114  Disgust can provide a useful 
basis for judging the legality of certain acts; for example, disgust might help in 
distinguishing various kinds of murders, with more disgusting ones more deserving of 
harsher sanctions.115  It might be possible to develop appropriately structured disgust 
responses within the law “so that we come to value what is genuinely high and to despise 
what is genuinely low.”116   
 
                     
108   See Ronald S. Immerman and Wade C. Mackey, An Additional Facet of the Incest Taboo:  A 
Protection of the Mating-Strategy template, 158 J. Genetic Psychol. 151 (1997).   
109  Id. 
110  See Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, supra note __, at 1645. 
111  For some of the most useful commentary on this issue, see, e.g., The Passions of Law, supra note __; 
Haidt, supra note __. 
112  John Witte, Can America Still Ban Polygamy?, Christianity Today Magazine (May 2008), available at 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/article_print.html?id=55605.   
113   See William Ian Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust 2 (1997).  Miller provides a social history and 
defense of disgust.  For insightful discussion of the politics of disgust in conjunction with Lawrence and 
traditional  religious approaches to same-sex relationships, see William Eskridge, Body Politics:  Lawrence 
v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion,  57 Fla. L. Rev. 1011 (2005). 
114  Miller, supra note _,  at 15.  Miller hypothesizes that some elements of incest definitions, such as the 
prohibition on  parent-child relationships, are in fact universal.  Id. at 260 (n. 39). 
115   Dan Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1621 (1998); The Progressive 
Appropriation of Disgust, in Bandes, supra note __, at 63. 
116   Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation, supra note __, at 71. 
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On the other hand, disgust is an emotion that has, as Lawrence shows, typically 
been used as a way to ostracize and discriminate against acts that are culturally 
unpopular.117  Those on the right are “most vulnerable” to these emotions, while people 
on the “left tend to be afraid of them;”118 they establish a hierarchy of appropriate 
behaviour that attempts to limit not just public, but also intimate, actions.119  While the 
acts themselves may not be harmful, culturally conditioned responses result in strong 
feelings of aversion that, without any other basis, are converted into law.  The long 
history of anti-miscegenation laws provides an example of how one group’s feelings of 
disgust resulted in discriminatory legislation.  For incest, disgust may be a comparably 
unstable basis.  As Martha Nussbaum claims, not all incestuous relationships inspire the 
same amount of disgust; “if we want to find reasons to make [brother-sister or adult first 
cousin] incest illegal, disgust will not help us, and arguments about health issues are 
perhaps exactly what we need.”120   The emotion of disgust is, on this view, an unstable 
basis for making legal decisions.  
 
Within contemporary social psychology, there is a healthy debate on the nature 
(literally) of how we develop moral reasoning.  Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model 
suggests that moral reasoning follows moral judgment; we develop reasons to support our 
moral intuitions121 and, within certain limitations, we do follow our intuitions.122  Moral 
judgments, then, result from innate intuitions although, Haidt explains, they are also 
affected by social context and groupings.123 By contrast, others argue that rational 
deliberation and reasoning are critical in the development of moral judgments.124 
 
                     
117   See Martha Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity:  Disgust, Shame, and the Law 125, 171 (2004).   The 
Philospher Leon Kas has used repugnance as a means for limiting varopus new uses of reproductive 
technology, including cloning.  E.g., Leon R. Kass, Defending Human Dignity, in  Human Ethics and 
Human Dignity 297, 298 (President’s Council on  Bioethics 2008), avail. at  
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/human_dignity/human_dignity_and_bioethics.pdf.  
118 Drew Westen, The Political Brain 380 (2007). 
119 Jonathan Haidt, The moral emotions, in Handbook of affective sciences 852 ( J. Davidson, K. R. 
Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith, ed. 2003), avail. at http://faculty.virginia.edu/haidtlab/articles/haidt.the-
moral-emotions.manuscript.html. 
120  Id. at 81. 
121  Haidt, The Emotional Dog, supra note __, at 814, 830; see generally Milton C. Regan, Moral 
Intuitions and Organizational Structure, 51 St. Louis L.J. 941, 955-962 (2007). 
122 Simone Schnall, Johnathan Haidt, Gerald L. Clore, and Alexander H. Jordan, 34 Pers. Soc. Psychol. 
Bull 1096, 1106 (2008)(finding disgust particularly effective at affecting moral judgments). 
123 Jonathan Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund, Social intuitionists answer six questions about morality, in Moral 
Psychology, vol. 2:  The Cognitive Science of Morality 181 (W. Sinnott-Armstrong ed. 2007), avail. at 
http://faculty.virginia.edu/haidtlab/articles/haidt.bjorklund.social-intuitionists-answer-6-questions.doc (pp. 
8-10 of this version); see also Richard E. Redding,  It’s Really About Sex:  Same-Sex Marriage, Lesbigay 
Parenting, and the Psychology of Disgust, 15 Duke J. Gender L. & Poly 127, 188-89 (2008)(discussing role 
of disgust in response to gay sex).   
124 E.g., Pizarro and Bloom, supra note -_, at 195.  The separation of law and moral ideals, of course, has a 
long history in jurisprudence, in, for example, the nineteenth century work of John Austin.  
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Ultimately, the initial reaction of disgust may serve as a useful guide, so long as it is then 
challenged and subjected to more rigorous analysis, exploring its bases and engaging in 
discussion.125   
 
2.   Is There a Feminist Approach to Incest?  
 
Feminists have considered a variety of issues relating to incest.  Most feminists 
believe that father or mother/child incest is exploitative, at least when the child is a 
minor.126 Indeed, these insights about power and family dynamics are confirmed by an 
analysis of the 28 criminal incest cases decided by state courts over the past decade (list 
attached).  All [but 1-2] involved an older man, such as a stepfather, uncle, or father.  
Studies of father-daughter incest have shown that daughters do not initiate the sexual 
behaviour, and that daughters experience strongly negative emotions, such as disgust and 
fear.127 
 
Other aspects of the incest ban are more contested and result in challenges to the 
traditional justifications as exploiting women.  Theorist Judith Butler suggests that the 
anthropological justification for the taboo, the concept that the taboo requires marriage 
outside of one’s kin group, functions to subjugate women, who are unable to remain 
within their own tribes, but must serve as reproductive vessels for other cultures.128  
Similarly, anthropologist Susan McKinnon has observed that the incest taboo maintains 
patriarchal control over women because it allows men to control women’s 
reproduction.129 
  
 Numerous scholars argue for relaxing the incest ban on consensual sexual 
relationships between adults.  Such bans cannot, they observe, be maintained given the 
Court’s recognition of a liberty right in consensual sexual relationships: “we think it is 
straightforward that a respect for autonomy and limited government permits consenting 
adults to engage in the sexual relations they deem appropriate . . . we largely agree with 
[Justice Scalia that Lawrence] makes it difficult to resist the conclusion we draw.”130   
                     
125 See, e.g., Gregory E. Kaebnick, Emotions, Rationality, and the “Wisdom of Repugnance,” 38 Hastings 
Ctr. Rep. 36, 44 (2008); Regan, supra note __, at 962-633 (“intuitions are not necessarily irreducible 
intractable phenomena, but may be amenable to deliberate revision and construction in some case . . .we 
need not regard oral intuitions as beyond our understanding or influence”).  The interrelated role of 
emotions and reason, reminding us of, for example, David Hume, has also become popular in explanations 
of voting behaviours.  See, e.g., George Lakoff, The Politics of the Mind (2008); Drew Westen, The 
Politics of the Brain (2007).    Kass 
126  
127   Mark T. Erickson, Evolutionary Thought and the Current Clinical Understanding of Incest, in 
INBREEDING, INCEST, AND THE INCEST TABOO:  THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 
161, 167 (Arthur P. Wolf and William H. Durham eds. 2004). 
128 Judith Butler, Is Kinship Already Always Heterosexual?, 13 differences 14 (2002), avail. at 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/differences/v013/13.1butler.html   Gerda Lerner makes a similar argument. 
129  Susan McKinnon, The Economies in Kinship and the paternity of Culture:  Oriign Stories in Kinship 
Theory, in Relative Values:  Reconfiguring Kinship Studies 277, 293, 297(Sarah Franklin and Susan 
McKinnon eds. 2001); see also Cahill, supra note __, at 610 (discussing McKinnon’s theory). 
130  Jennifer Collins, Ethan Lieb, and Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U.L. Rev. __ 
(forthcoming 2008) (draft at 48 and n. 169), available on SSRN. 
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Although she does not advocate overturning incest laws, Professor Courtney Cahill urges 
“that the law reappraise the extent to which disgust motivates” these laws.131  One student 
note writer argues that Lawrence requires courts to favor “liberty over loathing,” and 
thereby allow consensual incestuous relationships.132 
 
By contrast, feminist theorists who concentrate on father/child incest are more 
likely to highlight the dangers of incest.  Focusing on the power imbalances inherent in 
“an asymmetrical relationship of dependency” leads to prohibitions on certain 
relationships, regardless of whether they are established through blood, marriage, or 
caretaking.133  Although uncle/niece is not generally a direct dependency relationship, 
inter-generational relationships involve comparable power dynamics, and should be 
included in the prohibition.  
 
A final feminist insight revisits behavioral biology, suggesting that men's and 
women's different reproductive strategies raise the possibility that technology will 
magnify the reproductive advantages of dominant men.  The feminist arguments 
identifying polygamy as a form of male dominance relate to these concerns.  As 
Professor June Carbone notes:  
 
Behavioral biology, with support from anthropology, suggests that a hunter 
gatherer society limited the possibilities of one man siring too many children.  
 Once technology made an increase in wealth possible, it expanded the 
opportunities for differential reproduction . . .  Many argue that monogamy then 
became a critical aspect of democracy not to increase the status of women, but to 
limit the reproductive advantages of powerful men for the benefit of other men.   
This system, of course, also linked individual women's status to their relationship 
to their husbands, and used legitimacy to privilege some offspring over others, 
and tie the well being of a given woman's children to her relationship with their 
father.  Unlimited sperm donation threatens to set up a new status hierarchy, with 
big reproductive payoffs for those men who would be picked from the fertility 
clinic lineup.  Some men would find that very attractive, while most of us are 
horrified.134 
 
 Feminism provides multiple understandings and potential justifications for 
limiting the number of offspring from any individual donor, including a profound 
appreciation for the complexities of an incest ban.  Because this article uses incest as a 
primary – albeit not the only – justification for such limits, the next section turns to a 
legal analysis of the incest ban  
 
                     
131   Cahill, supra note __, at 1611. 
132  Brenda J. Hammer, Note:  Tainted Love:  What the Seventh Circuit Got Wrong in Muth v. Frank, 56 
DePaul L. Rev. 1065, 1097 (2007). 
133 Jennifer Collins, et al., Punishing Family Status (Draft at 47-48).  As they define “asymmetrical 
dependency,”, it is “relationships where one person possesses substantial authority and responsibility over 
another person who is largely dependent for his or her well-being on the authority-wielding person.”  Id. at 
48 n. 168. 
134 Email from Professor June Carbone (Aug. 11, 2008)(citations omitted). 
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IV. WHY IS INCEST OVER THE LEGAL LINE? 
 
Although incest is the stuff of popular culture, it appears much more rarely in the 
legal world.  A Lexis search for criminal incest cases in state courts over the past decade 
yielded comparatively few criminal cases.  Leigh Bienen’s landmark 1998 article, 
Defining Incest, has been cited fewer than 15 times in the Lexis or Westlaw databases.135  
Based on Lawrence, however, scholars have begun to reexamine the incest ban.  Incest 
also figures in the litany of cultural and legal disasters that critics claim might result from 
recognizing a constitutional right to the “liberty” of sexual privacy.   This part first 
examines Supreme Court doctrine on the relationship of incest to other issues of sexual 
privacy before turning to a discussion of the justifications for the incest ban.   
 
A. Just What Is Private? 
 
The Supreme Court has never opined directly on the constitutionality of the incest 
ban, although the word “incest” does occasionally appear (usually regarding a list of 
possible offenses other than the one of which the defendant was convicted), and the Court 
has considered criminal procedure issues in connection with incest convictions.136  Incest 
appears as a more direct concern in a limited number of the Court’s cases on the 
parameters of reproductive privacy.  In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court 
analyzed various challenges to a Pennsylvania statute setting limits on access to 
abortion.137  The Court upheld limits applicable to minors seeking abortions, but struck 
down various limits for adult women, relying on the Due Process Clause and its 
protection of “liberty.”  In his dissent, Justice Scalia defended the criminalization of 
various private actions, including incest:     
 
The emptiness of the "reasoned judgment" that produced Roe is displayed 
in plain view by the fact that . . . the best the Court can do to explain how 
it is that the word "liberty" must be thought to include the right to destroy 
human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate 
a value judgment and conceal a political choice. . . . But it  is  obvious to 
anyone applying "reasoned judgment" that the same adjectives can be 
applied to many forms of conduct that this Court . . . has held are not 
entitled to constitutional protection -- because, like abortion, they are 
forms of conduct that have long been criminalized in American society. 
Those adjectives might be applied, for example, to homosexual sodomy, 
polygamy, adult incest, and suicide, all of which are equally "intimate" 
and "deeply personal" decisions involving "personal autonomy and bodily 
integrity," and all of which can constitutionally be proscribed because it is 
our unquestionable constitutional tradition that they are proscribable.138 
                     
135  
136 Plugging in the term “incest” for a search of Supreme Court cases on LEXIS resulted in 57 cases.  In 
Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400 (1987), the Court considered a Double Jeopardy challenge in the context of 
an incestuous act.   In Kentucky v. Hamilton, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984), the Court  
137 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
138   Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 983-84 (Scalia, J. dissenting); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 
(1986).  The dissent noted that a:  “court could find simple, analytically sound distinctions between certain 
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And here he is in Lawrence, accusing the majority of undermining traditional 
prohibitions on a wide variety of sex crimes:   
 
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, 
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity 
are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based 
on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by 
today's decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its 
decision to exclude them from its holding.139   
 
The majority in Lawrence, however, did not mention incest at all, and did, in fact, 
“cabin” its holding.  It explicitly clarified the “scope of its decision,” observing that the 
“case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or 
coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It 
does not involve public conduct or prostitution.”140  
 
B. Is Disgust a Constitutional Justification? 
 
 If the dominant theme of abortion cases now concerns the jurisprudence of regret,141 
disgust is the corresponding theme in the reproductive privacy cases.  Indeed, Courtney 
Cahill has written a fascinating article about the “slippery slope” that is so critical to 
Justice Scalia’s accusations in  Lawrence, suggesting the importance of challenging “the 
extent to which incest-revulsion has substituted for national evaluation of the incest taboo 
(and anything to which incest has been compared).”142  Like others, she calls attention to 
the role of repugnance in creating taboos, and the need to question the validity of this 
visceral, emotional reaction as a basis for law-making.   Yet, as this article suggests, it 
                                                             
private, consensual sexual conduct, on the one hand, and adultery and incest . . .With respect to incest, a 
court might well agree with respondent that the nature of familial relationships renders true consent to 
incestuous activity sufficiently problematical that a blanket prohibition of such activity is warranted.”   Id. 
at 199, 209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
139  Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 586, 590 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
140   Id. at 578. Indeed, mPage: 27 
uch of the commentary on Lawrence mentions Kennedy’s efforts to acknowledge the 
value of same-sex intimacy, thus arguably distinguishing homosexuality from polygamy, 
and arguably incest. 
 
141  See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J..,dissenting),  Neil Siegel, Judicial Statesmanship, 86 Tex. 
L. Rev. 959, 1025 (2008).  Justice Ginsburg scathing observed that, “[u]ltimately, the Court admits that 
"moral concerns" are at work . . . [and that] the  notion that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act furthers any 
legitimate governmental interest is, quite simply, irrational.”  Id. at 1647, 1653.  Thanks to Nancy Levit for 
this analogy. 
142   Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust:  A 
Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1543, 
1609 (2005).  
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may be possible to distinguish incest from other consensual sexual relationships that have 
elicited moral revulsion, using rationales other than disgust.143   
 
 The role of morality and consensus within constitutional law jurisprudence defies 
any precise definition.  In interpreting the meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment, for example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to 
“evolving standards of decency.”144  As in Lawrence and Roe, the Court counts states 
with specific approaches to determine the parameters of “decency,” another term with 
indefinite moral reach that depends on cultural concepts of appropriateness.  While regret 
and disgust are emotional responses, their underlying content is inseparable from 
comparable  cultural concepts that establish a baseline of socially acceptable conduct in 
the same way as decency.  Of course, as the Court pointed out in Kennedy (a case 
involving rape by a stepfather), societal “[c]onsensus is not dispositive.”145  On the other 
hand, the Court used much of its Kennedy opinion to discuss the penalties for child 
rapists in various states, and the Court also attempted to distinguish the “’moral 
depravity’” of child rape from the depravity involved in murder.146  The dissent 
challenged the majority’s gradations of acts of moral depravity, observing that, to 
“ordinary Americans, the very worst child rapists . . . are the epitome of moral 
depravity.”147  The question, then, of what role morality, emotions, and evolving social 
norms should play in constitutional jurisprudence remain unresolved.    
 
C.  Incest is Different 
 
In light of the various criticisms of the incest ban, a justification for continuing 
the ban in any context must satisfy three tests to be coherent:  1) it must be segregable 
from incest’s possible uses as a legal and cultural reinforcement of the marital family; 2) 
it must carefully craft an approach towards moral repugnance so that disgust is not 
determinative of our ban on incestuous relationships; and 3) it must not call into question 
the growing acceptance of same sex relationships.   
 
 In this context, consider the California Supreme Court’s invocation of incest in 
its decision requiring the state to recognize same sex marriage.  The court carefully 
distinguished its rationale on the equality of same-sex relationships from the rationales 
supporting other sexual matings, noting: 
 
                     
143  For differing perspectives on emotion and the law, see generally The Passions of Law (Susan Bandes 
ed. 1999). 
144 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005);  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-343.pdfGeorgia (2008), Joanna H. D'Avella, NOTE: 
DEATH ROW FOR CHILD RAPE? CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT UNDER THE ROPER-
ATKINS "EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY" FRAMEWORK, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 129 (2006).  
Cynthia Lee notes that concepts of what the “reasomable man” might do is “problematic because views that 
are popularly held do not always correlate with notions of equality and fairness.”  Cynthia Lee, Murder and 
the Reasonable Man:  Passion and Fear in the Criminal Courtroom 4 (2003). 
145  Slip op. at 10. 
146   Id. at 27. 
147 Id. at 21 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
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 We emphasize that our conclusion that the constitutional right to 
marry properly must be interpreted to apply to gay individuals and gay 
couples does not mean that this constitutional right similarly must be 
understood to extend to polygamous or incestuous relationships . . . 
.because of their potentially detrimental effect on a sound family 
environment.148   
 
Constitutionally, then, there are several methods for upholding the incest ban.  
First, if consensual sexual relationships are part of a protected fundamental right, then the 
state may have a compelling interest in banning them.149  Compelling interests, as 
discussed in the next section, may range from protecting  children from abuse to 
protecting the family.150  If the level of scrutiny is either intermediate or rational basis, 
then the state’s compelling interest certainly justifies the ban.   
 
Second, there is a more fundamental question (as it were) which relates to what 
types of consensual sexual relationships are included within the right.  If the right to 
sexual privacy is defined to include only non-caretaking relationships, for example, then 
the level of scrutiny is irrelevant, and certain incestuous relationships fall outside the 
scope of the right. The right to sexual privacy could be defined to include relationships 
between:  1) adults who were never part of a caretaking relationship, and thus would 
exclude not just parent-child incest, but also stepparent-child incest, even in the absence 
of a legally recognized bond between the parent and the child;151 2) adults who are 
related through affinity or blood as second cousins or further (thus excluding uncle and 
aunt/niece and nephew) relationships.   
 
Third, even if some incest laws – such as those between comparatively distantly 
related relatives152 – might be suspect under a privacy analysis, a nuanced application of 
constitutional law can help in drawing the right lines both inside and outside of the 
reproductive technology world.  While Lawrence may call into question some forms of 
consensual intrafamilial relationships, it still allows for carefully crafted laws banning 
some forms of incest.153 
                     
148   In re Marriage Cases, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 5247 *170-171, n. 52 (emphasis added).  The dissent, however, 
echoes Justice Scalia’s admonition.  Id. *282. 
149   The state’s interests – other than disgust -- are discussed infra.  For further discussion of the 
constitutional implications, see Bratt, Is Incest Next, supra note __, at 350-352. 
150   See infra.  The definition of “family” is highly conflicted (see _Harv. L. Rev. ___, supra note __); here, 
I’m referring to inter-generational relationships of caretaking. 
151   Unless a stepparent has adopted a child, there is no legally recognized relationship. 
152   For one suggestion, see, e.g,  Joanna L. Grossman, The Consequences of Lawrence v. Texas, 
FindLaw's Writ, July 8, 2003, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20030708.html 
153  For differing perspectives on the applicability of a privacy analysis to issues of restricting choices 
within the reproductive technology world, such as by limiting the freedom of donors to sell gametes as 
frequently as they would like, of numerous consumers to purchase the one “best” donor, and of fertility 
clinics and banks to buy and sell without limits, see, e.g., Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights 
Not to Procreate, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1135 92008); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of 
Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 439 (2003); Goodwin, supra note __;  Rhadika Rao, Equal Liberty:  
Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality,” Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  __ (forthcoming 
2008); Reconceiving Privacy:  Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1077, 1083-
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Establishing the standard for measuring the constitutionality of an incest ban or 
the parameters of a right to sexual privacy depends on the question of what justifications 
exist for the prohibition.  The risk of birth defects may provide a rationale for the ban on 
incest in itself, while gay and lesbian sex does not result in such palpable harms.  This 
rationale is strongest between immediate family members and becomes more attenuated 
with cousins.   Once the ban is recognized to require a compelling state interest, it doesn’t 
necessarily follow that every aspect is subject to a compelling state interest scrutiny.  The 
dividing line among different forms of incest may be arbitrary. 
  
IV.  Setting Limits in the Gamete World 
 
Aside from concerns about incest, there may be reasons special to the 
reproductive technology world to limit gamete donations.  This section explores the 
multiple reasons for establishing limits, ranging from incest concerns to protecting donors 
and donor-conceived families.  
 
A.  Protecting Donors and Donor-Conceived Families   
 
All gamete donors face psychological issues involved in providing eggs or sperm 
to another person in order to create a child.154  There are also similar to what? issues of 
exploitation; a man who provides sperm or a woman who provides eggs is commodifying 
body products.155  While each of these must be considered when it comes to limits on 
donation, there are additional issues for each type of gamete provider. Awkward 
paragraph. 
 
For egg donors, limits are much easier to justify based on health risks, and the 
feminist health community has mobilized to document the effects of fertility drugs on 
women.   Judy Norsigan, the executive director of Our Bodies, Ourselves,  has written 
about the “substantial risks to women’s health” from multiple egg extraction.156 There is 
                                                             
84 (1998); Cass Sunstein, Is there a Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53 Hastings L.J. 987, 994 (2002)(“none 
of this means that there is a presumptive right to do whatever might be done to increase the likelihood of 
having, or not having, a child”).   
154 Although there is relatively little literature on this in the reprotechnology world, there is a significant 
amount of comparable discussion in the adoption world.  Anecdotal accounts in the reprotech world 
abound, however.  See, e.g., Making Babies, Sperm Donor Confession, ABC Nightline, Aug. 30, 2006 (one 
sperm donor “realized that there might be some child some day that would want to find me and just to see 
what I looked like or where they came from and I hadn't given any thought to whether or not they'd be able 
to do that,” and decided to make his identity known to potential offspring.  
155   For further analysis of the commodification issues, see Ertman, supra note __; Martha Ertman and Joan 
Williams, Rethinking Commodification (2005); Baby Markets (Michele Goodwin ed. forthcoming 2009). 
156  Judy Norsigian, Risks to Women in Embryo Cloning, Boston Globe, Feb. 25, 2005; Egg Donation for 
IVF and Stem Cell Research:  Time to Weigh the Risks to Women’s Health (2005), avail. at  
http://www.etopiamedia.net/empnn/pdfs/norsigian1.pdf; see Barbara Seaman, Is this Any Way to Have a 
Baby?, O Mag., Feb. 2004, avail. at http://www.gilliansanson.com/articles/infertility.htm.  Seaman was the 
co-founder of the National Women’s Health Network.  
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also a problem of disclosure: egg donors are often not provided with sufficient 
information concerning potential risks.157   
 
 
Aside from the emotional issues,158 egg donation poses both short and long-term 
risks.  The first set of risks result from the impact of the hormones.  The most common 
short-term complication for oocyte donors is ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome 
(OHSS).   Indeed, the donation procedure itself is actually controlled oocyte 
hyperstimulation, designed to produce the maximum number of mature eggs, and a mild 
form of OHSS is considered almost inevitable.159  Severe OHSS is rare but can be fatal, 
with symptoms that include kidney and liver dysfunction and respiratory distress.   Some 
studies have shown that severe OHSS may be less common in donors than in women 
undergoing IVF, partially based on the fact that donors stop after the eggs have been 
retrieved, while IVF patients continue with additional procedures and hormones in their  
attempts to conceive.160  On the other hand, the risk increases based on the number of 
donations.161  To minimize OHSS, researchers are studying new drug protocols and 
possible genetic markers, although the risks remain.162  
 
Finally, the long-term risks of the hormones involved in oocyte donation include 
various gynecological cancers, such as breast, ovarian, and uterine.  Several medical 
studies have shown that women who repeatedly undergo treatment with fertility drugs, as 
do repeat oocyte donors, have an increased risk for these cancers.  However, the evidence 
is based largely on infertile women undergoing IVF, and several causes of infertility are 
acknowledged to cause cancer as well.163  Disentangling the data is difficult, but initial 
analysis suggests that healthy donors do not necessarily share the same increased risk for 
breast and ovarian cancer, although the extent to which fertility treatments do affect those 
cancers for healthy donors is uncertain.  On the other hand, the data on  the risk of uterine 
cancer for healthy donors is sparse but more concern.164  Moreover, researchers do not 
know whether repeated donations can affect the donor’s future fertility, and they are still 
uncertain about the psychological consequences.  
 
A second set of risks, beyond simply taking hormones, concerns the oocyte 
retrieval process itself.  This is a surgical procedure that  requires repeated punctures of 
the vaginal wall and ovarian follicles.  As with any other surgery, complications are 
                     
157   N. Adsuar, J. Zweifel, E. Pritts, M. Davidson, D. Olive and S. Lindheim, Assessment of Wishes 
Regarding Disposition of Oocytes and Embryo Management Among Ovum Donors in an Anonymous Egg 
Donation Program,” Fertility & Sterility Journal 84 (2005): n. 8. 
158  See Julia Derek, Confessions of an Egg Donor (2004). 
159 Linda Guidice, Eileen Santa, Robert Pool, Eds., Assessing the Medical Risks of Human Oocyte Donation 
for Stem Cell Research: Workshop Report (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2007), 18. 
160 Ruth Farrell, Susannah Baruch, and Kathy Hudson, “IVF, Egg Donation, and Women’s Health,” 
Genetics & Public Policy Center (2006), 
http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/IVF_Egg_Donation_Womens_Health_final.pdf. 
161 See ASRM Guidelines, supra note __.   
162  See Farrell, Baruch and Hudson, supra note __: 2. 
163  L. Brinton, K. Moghissi, B. Scoccia, C. Westhoff, and E. Lamb, “Ovulation Induction and Cancer 
Risk,” Fertility & Sterility Journal 83 (2005): 261-74. 
164 See Guidice, Santa, and Pool, supra note ___: 24-6. 
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possible, including vaginal bleeding and infection.   While the procedure is generally 
done on an outpatient basis, physicians usually use some form of sedation.165  Thus, the 
risks inherent in anesthesia, such as stroke and respiratory failure, are also present.166 
 
The short and long-term health risks involved in oocyte donation are numerous 
and potentially serious, and most policy-makers believe that these risks require further 
research.  Nonetheless, the ASRM concluded that “there are no clearly documented long-
term risks” for egg donors, although, “because of the possible health risks . . . it would 
seem prudent to consider limiting the number of stimulated cycles for a given oocyte 
donor to approximately six.” 167   Although numerous eggs can be retrieved in each cycle, 
many of them will not be fertilized and develop into children.  The recommendation thus 
provides an inherent limit on the number of children who might be born from the gametes 
of any individual oocyte donor.  Indeed, many fertility clinics do limit donation cycles 
per donor to six and some to as few as three; 168  these limits are entirely self-imposed, 
and a donor with proven fecundity is valuable to these clinics.  There are well-publicized 
stories of women who have donated at double the recommended limit.169   
 
For sperm donors, the primary issue – aside from commodification -- is not the 
donor’s  health or future fertility, but how many related children should result from one 
sperm donor.  Any form of donation, either egg or sperm, involves the potential for 
“inadvertent consanguinity,” where a donor has provided gametes to different families 
and the resulting children do not know of their shared genetic heritage.170   As one former 
donor explained his unease at having produced sperm that might have resulted in 
hundreds of  offspring, “If you do the math again, there may be 100 young women out 
there that are basically my son's age that are his half siblings. I have to tell him that's how 
it is.”171 
Many sperm banks impose a limit on the number of children who can be born 
from one person’s donated sperm.  While the ASRM recommends taking into account the 
geographical area and population base for a particular donor, it suggests a limit of 25 
births per donor.172  This limitation makes sense, and it should be incorporated into the 
FDA’s rules for sperm donors.  In an age of easy travel, donor secrecy, and limited 
understanding of genetics, reducing the number of children that can be born from each 
donor reduces the possibility of inadvertent consanguinity.   
 
Limits also prevent the widespread dissemination of disease.  For example five 
donor-conceived offspring – products of the same donor -- in Michigan all share the same 
extremely rare disease of congenital neutropenia.173 Donation allows an individual to 
                     
165   Repetitive Oocyte Donation, supra note __, at S216. 
166 See Guidice, Santa, and Pool, supra note ___, at 34-6. 
167 ASRM Guidelines, supra note __: S159. 
168 See http://ovatherainbow.com/FAQs egg donors.htm. 
169 See Julia Derek, Confessions of a Serial Egg Donor (2004). 
170   ASRM Guidelines, supra note ___: S158. 
171 Making Babies, Sperm Donor Confession, supra note __. 
172 ASRM Guidelines, supra note ___: S42-43. 
173  Judy Graham, When a disease is donated; Mom's quest to warn daughter's offspring goes to the heart of 
a thorny debate on sperm, egg donors, Chi. Trib., March 27, 2008, at C1; see Emily Bazelon, The Children 
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have multiple offspring – simultaneously – before the potential of disease transmission is 
realized.  Setting limits cannot prevent against disease transmission, but can help in 
minimizing the number of people affected. 
 
A final issue concerns informed consent and, its corollary, counseling.  For both 
kinds of gamete donors and for embryo donors, the informed consent process should 
include issues relating to the ultimate disclosure of their identities, as well as medical 
risks.  The informed consent process should begin early, to ensure that all involved 
understand the implications of the treatment.  This may be a deliberate choice in order to 
maximize the potential donor pool, given the demand for eggs.  The informed consent 
process could include a counseling component as well.     
 
Various professional organizations, including both the Family Law Section of the 
American Bar Association and the ASRM have already developed  guidelines for the 
informed consent process.174   At the least, full disclosure should include a discussion of 
the known and potential health risks from donation, and the donor’s choice of how to 
dispose of any unfertilized eggs.  Clinics can implement various measures to minimize 
pressure that patients may feel by, for example, providing information early and allowing 
patients to ask questions, assuring patients that the informed consent process is 
confidential, and that decisions concerning the ultimate disposition of their gametic 
material will not be disclosed to anyone involved in their treatment.175  
 
As a pragmatic manner, children are increasingly being told that they are donor-
conceived, and prospective parents are increasingly choosing known donors.176  With 
donor-conceived increasingly searching for their gamete providers, the providers 
themselves may be reluctant to be found by so many offspring.177  On the other hand, 
increasingly openness may result in more investigation of possible consanguinity by 
donor-conceived offspring before they become sexually involved with a partner.  In the 
alternative, marriage licenses might be conditioned upon a genetic screening to ensure 
that there is no genetic link between the intended spouses.  While it may also be possible 
to condition marriage licenses on a voluntary agreement not to produce children (or to 
require, as is true in some states, that the parties both be over a certain age), this begs the 
issue of whether such relationships should ever be permissible. 178 
 
B.  But is Change Possible? 
                                                             
of Donor X, O Mag., April 1, 2008, p. 250 (autism); Denise Grady, As the Use of Donor Sperm Increases, 
Secrecy can be a Health Hazard, N.Y. Times, June 6, 2006, p. F6. 
174   ASRM Guidelines, supra note ___: S46; American Bar Association Family Law Section Committee, 
“Proposed Model Code Governing Assisted Reproduction,” (2007), 
http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/artmodelcode_november2007.pdf. 
175 See B. Lo, V. Chou, M. Cedars, E. Gates, R. Taylor, R. Wagner, L. Wolf and K. Yamamoto, “Informed 
Consent in Human Oocyte, Embryo, and Embryonic Stem Cell Research,” Fertility &  Sterility Journal 82 
(2004): 559. 
176   Golombok, et al.  See Jeff Stryker, An Uncomfortable Question for Sperm Banks (2007), 
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2007/11/regulation-or-free-markets/scienceprogress.org. 
177  See the Donor Sibling Registry website.   
178 How do the risks vary between half siblings and full siblings? 
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Unlike other countries, the United States has adopted a piecemeal approach to 
regulating the technologies, with oversight shared between the federal and state 
governments, the industry, and the market.179  There is a tradition of federalism and 
industry self-regulation that characterizes the medical profession.  On the other hand, 
Congress has enacted legislation that applies to the entire industry, and the FDA has 
adopted regulations that apply on a national level.  Consequently, the federal procedures 
already in place could be adapted to protect against multiple donations by any individual.   
While the industry has already promulgated voluntary guidelines, they are not enforced, 
and clinics and banks are free to decide how to approach these issues themselves.  The 
existing federal procedures thus provide an appropriate starting place. 
 Once a potential donor arrives at a clinic, the clinic must take certain steps to 
determine the donor’s eligibility, including a review of the applicant’s medical records 
for various communicable diseases, such as Chlamydia and HIV.180    If the donor passes 
the medical records examination, then the clinic must test the actual specimen collected 
for communicable diseases.181  All tests must be done using FDA-licensed or approved 
screening tests.182  Further, anonymous sperm donors must be re-tested at least six 
months after the date of donation, which means that the specimens are collected, tested, 
quarantined for six months, and then tested again before use.183 Interestingly, the same 
stipulation does not apply to donated oocytes, which are only required to be withheld 
until donor eligibility is established, without the comparable necessity of re-testing.184  
Only after both screening and testing (and quarantine, for anonymous donors), is a donor-
eligibility determination made. 
The federal government and the ASRM each require detailed records on every donor.  
Because donors will be given different identification numbers by each bank, there must 
be an effective means to ensure that the same person does not attempt to evade limits on 
the number of donations per provider by visiting different recruiters and giving different 
names.  One solution would be for fertility clinics and sperm banks to collect a genetic 
sample that could be sent to a central repository for verification that the donor is not 
circumventing limits, and for ensuring a consistent identification number for any 
particular donor.  If each donor-conceived offspring knew, with certainty, the specific 
donor gamete number, then a new dating ritual – perhaps even before the first kiss – 
might involve inquiring about the genetic origins of one’s beloved potential sexual 
partner.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
                     
179  See See June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust: Building Ethical 
Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 509 (2006).Alicia 
Ouellette et al., Lessons Across the Pond: Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United Kingdom and 
the United States, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 419, 434-35 (2005).___ 
180 21 C.F.R. §1271.75 (2007). 
181 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.85(a) and (c). 
182 21 C.F.R. § 1271.80(c). 
183 21 C.F.R. § 1271.85(d). 
184 21 C.F.R. § 1271.60 (a). 
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Ultimately, I’m not sure what to do about disgust in the reproductive technology 
area.  Although one reaction to learning that one man has contributed sperm to create 
more than 100 offspring is disgust (perhaps awe for some), this is not necessarily a 
universal, or even a majority, response.  Some may be troubled (perhaps not “disgusted”) 
by the “unnaturalness” of so many offspring of one individual in our current culture of 
monogamy.185  Fears of inadvertent consanguinity contribute to this feeling of concern.  
These feelings -- of disgust or concern -- do not mandate an automatic ban on the 
possibility of inadvertent consanguinity, but they are helpful in developing a response.186   
Disgust should not serve as the basis for drawing a line for constitutional or regulatory 
demarcation, but does provide an “inkling”187 of the need to consider legal standards. 
 
Most of the traditional explanations for the incest prohibition do not apply in the 
reprotech context when it comes to restrictions on gamete provision. The Westermarck 
hypothesis and its contemporary modifications do not apply to gamete donors; the 
children typically have not been raised together.  While the parents may feel a bond at 
having used the same gamete donor, this does not translate into the prolonged contact 
associated with the evolution of kin avoidance.   The anthropological explanation, which 
requires marrying out of one’s kin group in order to forge alliances and create a larger 
society, similarly does not apply because the half-genetically related offspring have been 
raised in different kin groups – although it is important to recognize that recipients of 
gametes from the same donor do feel connection and kinship based on biology   What 
remains are health concerns for donors, a fear of genetic abnormalities, feminist fears of 
unequal reproductive advantage, and the emotion of disgust – or concern.  These can help 
us in thinking about what it is we are seeking to regulate, and why.    
 
 
 
                     
185 See, e.g.,  supra n. __ (conclusions of Professor Carbone). 
186   See Toni M. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotion, in Bandes, supra note __, 80, 97, 101. 
187   The word “inkling” belongs to Nancy Levit.  [need permission] 
